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HEARTBREAK IN DARFUR:
WHEN DOES GENOCIDE BECOME GENOCIDE?

Konjit Gomar*
For more than a year now, the mass killings of black African civilians by progovernment, Arabized' militias known as the Janjaweed have plagued the westem region of the Sudan. 2 Hostilities between the region's black peasant farmers
and Arabized nomads have existed for decades as the two groups have long grappled with one another for control of the country's Darfur region. 3 However, the
situation boiled over in or around February 2003 after two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement began
attacking government property in an attempt to end what they consider the economic and political suppression of Sudan's black African populations in favor of
their pro-government, Arabized brethren. 4 Comprised of tribesmen belonging to
Konjit Gomar is a 2006 Juris Doctor candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
She would like to thank the editorial board and staff of the International Law Review for their warm
encouragements during the editorial process. She would also like to thank her mother for her gentle
nudging and sound advise.
I The author would like to note the racial similarities between the peoples involved in the present
conflict. Undoubtedly African in racial make-up, the Sudanese people nevertheless insist on distinguishing themselves from one another with the use of the racial labels "black African" and "Arab." Such
labels reflect the political history of Sudan's western region. See Reports: Peoples Darfur, at http://
www.sudanupdate.org/REPORTS/PEOPLES/Darf.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (Similar in size to
France, "Darfur was an independent sultanate until 1917, when it was the last region to be incorporated
into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Arabic word Dar roughly means homeland, and its population of
nearly four million is divided into several Dars; not only of the Fur people, as its name suggests, but also
of several communities, determined by livelihood as much as ethnicity. These ecological and social
distinctions are more meaningful then the administrative divisions imposed by government. Ethnicity is
not itself clear-cut, given the long history of racial mixing between the indigenous "non-Arab" peoples
and the "Arabs", who are now distinguished by cultural-linguistic attachment rather than race.").
2 See Q & A: Sudan's Darfur Conflict, BBC NEWS UK Edition (2004) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hilworldlafrica/349673I.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). [ hereinafter BBC Q & A3.
3 Crippled by drought and desertifiction, Darfur has long been one of the most improvished regions
in the Sudan. The evergrowing scarcity of arable lands has inspired inter-group hostilities between black
peasant farmers and Arabized nomads. These hostilities were originally slight with low casuality numbers on both sides. However, as more automatic weapons entered the region from neighboring Chad,
inter-group conflicts became more devestating at times resulting in the slaughter and destruction of entire
communities. But it would be a mistake to characterize these conflicts as incidents resting solely upon a
contest involving land. In addition to the struggle over Darfur's remaining natural resources there exist
controversies touching upon political power, lifestyle and culture. Frustrated with their lack of representation in local politics, Arabized nomads-who make up a minority of the population- have fiercely
fought (some say with Khartoum's support) to not only achieve representation but to also completely
usurp political power from non-Arabized Darfurians. See Human Rights Watch, Darfur in Flames:
Atrocities in Western Sudan Vol. 16, No.5(A),40-42 (Apr. 2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2004/sudan0404/index.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Darfur in Flames]; See also Human
Rights Watch, Darfur civil Conflict 1989-1990, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/
darfur2.htm (last modified June 25, 2004); See also Human Rights Watch, Darfur Liberation Front at
http://www.globalsecuity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm (last modified September 5, 2004) [hereinafter Liberation Front].
4 See Liberation Front supra note 3. Though many Darfurians are practicing Muslims, over forty
percent are non-Arabs. Id. Even among those who practice Islam, many are against Sudan's arbabized
*
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Darfur's Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups, the rebels also sought protection from the Janjeweed who have a history of traversing the affected areas on
5
horse back in armed militia groups.
Sudan is accused of responding to the rebel attacks by further arming the Arab
Janjaweed militia and giving it license to engage in a "scorched earth policy"
which has entailed the systematic killings of unarmed civilians, the mass kidnapping and rape of young girls and women, and the looting of villages and farms
which are subsequently burned to the ground. 6 Many survivors report that the
Janjaweed used racial epithets during these attacks.7 Although the Sudanese
government has denied backing the Janjaweed 8 , civilians who have escaped the

onslaught report that government helicopters and planes usher in the Janjaweed
militia with air raids and bombings of villages. 9 As a result, causality numbers

are estimated between fifteen and fifty thousand and more than a million persons
have been displaced as they seek refuge along the Chadian border. 10 But even

there they are apparently not safe, as refugees have reported repeated Janjaweed
attacks along the peripheries of the displacement camps."
There would seem to be little reason-even if allowed-to return home. Most
Darfurians are subsistence farmers, their very survival dependent upon activities
initiated during the planting season. 12 The systematic destruction of farms and
villages coupled with the fear of future attacks has more or less halted all planting activities, thereby dashing any hope of a successful October harvest. 13 Hugovernment accusing it of refusing to share economic and political power with the people of Darfur. Id.

They furthermore accuse Sudan's government of turning a blind eye to Janjeweed abuses as a means to
futher "Arabize" the Darfurians and maintain power in the region. Id. See The Black Book History of
Darfur's Darkest Chapter, Sudan Tribune (Aug. 21, 2004) at http://www.sudantribune.com/articlejimpr.php3?id-article=4868 (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
5 Human Rights Watch,

DARFUR DESTROYED Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia

Forces in Western Sudan Vol. 16, No. 6(A) (May 2004), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudanO5O4/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004) [hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED]
6 Id.
7 Marc Lacey, U.S. Report on Violence in Sudan Finds a 'Pattern of Atrocities', N.Y.TIMES, August 24, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.comV2004/08/25/intemational/africa/25darfur.html (last
visited August 27, 2004). (In July 2004 the U.S. State Department conducted 257 interviews in displacement camps along the Chadian border. Id. The interviews were conducted to determine the truth behind

claims the Sudanese government was engaged in a genocidal campaign against ethnic Darfurians. Id.
Almost 50 percent of the refugees interviewed told of how they were attacked by government soliders
and the Janjaweed. Id. Many also accused governement soliders and the Janjaweed of using racial
epithets during these attacks including the phrases "Kill the slaves" and "We have orders to kill all
blacks." The terms "slave" and "black" are pejorative terms leveled against non-Arab Darfurians and
those belonging to the farming class.) .
8 Koert Lindijer, Analysis: Reigning in the Militia, BBC NEWS UK Edition at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/ /1/hi/world/africa/3540126.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
9 DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 5.
10 BBC Q & A, supra note 2.

1 See Alexis Masciarelli & Ilona Eveleens, Sudanese Tell of Mass Rape, BBC NEWS UK Edition at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3791713.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). (Details plights of Su-

danese women in their villages during an attack by the Janjaweed.)
12
13

See Darfur in Flames, supra note 3.
Id. See also Lindijer, supra note 8. There are also reports that after Janjaweed militia succeeded

in running fthe farmers off their lands, the families of Janjaweed members moved in. Id..
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manitarian agencies have already noted severe malnutrition among the children
within the displacement camps. 14 The lack of clean water has also contributed to
15
a high mortality rate among children from curable diseases such as diarrhea.
Due to the rough terrain and lack of infrastructure in Darfur, relief agencies are
unable to reach many of the displaced settlements. 16 Chadian communities playing host to the refugees also lack the financial resources and food stocks necessary to combat the crisis. 17 In May, the rainy season hit, further complicating
matters as the refugees' only means of shelter is often times small structures
made of twigs covered with torn plastic bags.1 8 And many of the refugees are
not even equipped with these. 19
The great potential for immense human loss as a result of starvation and the
spread of infectious diseases prompted the United Nations ("U.N.") in May 2004
to label the situation in Darfur, "the world's worst humanitarian crisis of the
year."' 20 The U.S. Congress assumed a more pessimistic view pronouncing in
July that the conflict in Darfur amounts to "genocide. ' 2 1 However, during his
trip to the Sudan this past June, US Secretary of State Colin Powell would only
concede that there exists "indicators and elements that would start to move you
toward a genocidal conclusion but we're not there yet."12 2 U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has also shied away from applying the term genocide to define
14 Darfur in Flames, supra note 3.
15 Aiding Darfur: A Nurse's Story V, BBC NEWS UK Edition (Oct. 22, 2004) at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3946079.stm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004)
16 Id.
17 Id.

18 Hilary Andersson, Sudan's Cruel and Slow Starvation, BBC NEWS UK Edition, (2004), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3922461.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
19 Id.
20 Muninni K. Mulers, It's Genocide in Darfur, (Aug. 9, 2004.), at http:/lallafrica.com/stories/

200408090532.html.
21 US House call Darfur 'genocide,' BBC NEWS UK Edition, July 23, 2004, at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3918765.stm; see also Sudan Says Conflict is 'Not Genocide,' CNN
World, July 24, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/07/24/sudan [hereinafter Not
Genocide].
22 Sudanese refugees welcome Powell, BBC NEWS WORLD Edition, (2004), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3849593.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). After the U.S. States Department
conducted an investigation into claims that genocide was occurring in Darfur, Colin Powell pronounced
on September 9, 2004 that he believed the Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias were committing
genocide on black African ethnic groups within the region. However, in spite of Powell's assessment
outside of threatening economic sanctions and encouraging both sides in the conflict (Sudanese rebel
groups and Sudan's central government) to reach a peace accord the international community has done
nothing substantial to end the violence. World powers remains divided on whether genocide exists and
on how best to address the crisis. Donor organizations have also been slow to provide adequate funds to
finace an African Union led peace force in the region. Meanwhile reports of mass killings still flow into
media outlets and some humanitarian organizations have pulled out of refugee areas. See Powell declares
genocide in Darfur BBC NEWS WORLD Edition (Sept. 9, 2004) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
3641820.stm. ("Use of word genocide does not legally obligate the US to act); see also The Crisis in
Darfur, U.S. Department of State (Sept. 9, 2004) at http:llwww.state.govlsecretary/rm/36042.htm; see
also Aid Groups Flee New Darfur Fighting, at CNN WORLD NEWS (Nov. 5, 2004) at http://
www.cnn.com2004/WORLD/africa/ll/05/sudan.darfur.reut/index.html;
See also Why Washington
Won't Save Darfur Villagers, Sudan Tribune (Oct. 6, 2004) at http://www.sudantribune.coml
article.php3?id-article=5837.
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the Darfur conflict 23 as have many international human rights groups and member states of the U.N. Security Counsel. 24 Most observers appear to take comfort
in labeling the Janjaweed attacks a program of "ethnic cleansing," knowing full
well that a cry of genocide would obligate the international community to become militarily involved under the Genocide Convention of 1948.25 With public
and political fallout still raging over the war and continued military presence in
Iraq, many nations seem reluctant to become entangled in yet another foreign
military campaign. The tightrope Western leaders now walk in their relations
with Arab states has no doubt also colored their interpretation and commitment to
26
the Darfur situation.
Although on July 30th the U.N. threatened economic sanctions if the Sudanese
government did not disarm the Janjaweed by August 31,27 many observers argue
that even if the Sudanese government wanted to disarm the militia-which many
doubt 2 - it is unrealistic to believe that the government can do so within the
thirty day time frame handed down by the U.N. 29 Given the numerous reports
and accusations concerning the Sudanese government's endorsement of the
Janjaweed attacks, many also question how safe the refugees would be upon
returning to their villages under the guard of the government's military personnel. 30 As the world's great powers struggle with how best to label and react to
the conflict, human lives are still being lost as reports of mass killings continue to
flow into media outlets. 31 Whatever one calls it, the debate over how to label the
Janjaweed attacks has raised important questions on the meaning of genocide, its
occurrence, and what evidence is needed to trigger its application as well as the
international community's resolve to crush it.
This Article asserts that the UN's Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Convention) is patently flawed.
By limiting its application to anti-group atrocities directed at ethnic, racial, national, and religious groups, the Convention's drafters have failed to provide protection to the most vulnerable groups today-political and economic groups. In
light of this flaw this Article also asserts that the Convention is essentially impo23 Not Genocide, supra note 21.
24 Id.

25 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p-genoci.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention].
26 See Ed O'Keefe and Jeffrey Marcus, Crisisin Sudan, washingtonpost.com (Sept. 9, 2004) at http:I/
www.washington post.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A20765-2004Jul1 ?language=printer.
27 The author is aware that by the time this article is published, the August 31 deadline will have
come and past. For historical purposes the date was included. See Powell declares genocide in Darfur
BBC NEWS WORLD Edition (Sept. 9, 2004) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3641820.stm (last visited Nov. 22, 2004).
28 See U.N. envoy pessimistic on Sudan, CNN WORLD (Aug. 11, 2004) at http://www.cnn.coml
2004/WORLD/Africa/08/l l/Sudan/index.html.
29 Lindijer, supra note 8.
30 Id.

31 See Thousands Flee New Darfur Clashes, BBC NEWS WORLD Edition at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/3630582.stm (last visited Oct, 19, 2004).
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tent, and must undergo a revision if it is to have any real deterrent effect in the
world today.
The Evolution and Interpretation of Genocide
Coined in 1944 by Ralph Lemkin, the term "genocide" is a combination of the
ancient Greek word genos, which means race or tribe, and the Latin word cide,
which means killing. 32 For Lemkin "genocide" referred to discriminatory activities directed at targeted national and ethnic groups. 33 He based his definition on
34
the atrocities Germany committed against European Jews during World War 1I.
The term was therefore all encompassing as it signified not only "the immediate
destruction of a nation. . .by the mass killings of all members of a nation" but
more importantly "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. '35 Thus according to Alexander Greenawalt, the
confiscation or destruction of a targeted group's cultural property, the forced cultural and religious assimilation of group members, as well as the imposition of
"'morally debasing" policies' aimed at eradicating the group's moral habits, all
constituted genocidal acts under Lemkin's definition. 36 Members of the targeted
in their individual capacity, but as members
group were therefore victimized "not
37
group."
national
[targeted]
of the
The U.N. General Assembly ultimately narrowed such a broad definition when
it formally adopted the Convention in 1948.38 Borrowing from Lemkin, Article 1
of the Convention pronounced genocide an international crime, "whether committed in time of peace or in time of war," which "[the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and punish."'39 Genocide is further defined in Article 2 as:
32 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Note, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case For A KnowledgeBased Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2270 (1999).
33 Id. at 2270-272.
34 Id. at

2270-272.

35 Id.
36 Id. ("If Lemkin's understanding of genocide is elusive, this may be explained in part by the context
in which he was writing. At the time when he published Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, World War II
was still in progress and, as a result, the specific policies of the Axis powers were his immediate subject.
In this light, his definition reads not so much as an attempt to clearly delineate a form of individual
criminal liability, but rather, as an indictment of the Axis Powers' general treatment of the populations
that they subjected. In addition, the breadth of Lemkin's concept may be explained in light of the threat
he perceived genocide as posing. Lemkin was ultimately less concerned with the evil motivations of
genocidal acts themselves than with the preservation of the rich array of nations and cultures that constituted the world community." ld. According to Greenawalt, Lemkin's concern with preserving the cultural contributions of human groups was shared by the U.N. General Assembly and was a motivating
factor in its adoption of Resolution 96 (1) which formerly pronounced genocide an international crime
and required U.N. member states to incorporate in their criminal codes laws aimed at preventing and
punishing genocidal acts.) Id. at 2272-273.
37 Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 2271.
38 Id.
39 Genocide Convention, supra note 25, Article 1.
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Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
a) killing members of the group;
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 40
Therefore to properly trigger a finding of genocide there must exists three
elements: (1) the destruction or attempted destruction of a human group in whole
or in part; (2) the victimization of the group because of its national, racial, ethnical, or religious status; and (3) the specific perpetration 41of the destructive act(s)
as a means to annihilate the targeted group as a group.
Critics have long complained that the Convention's definition of genocide is
too narrow and therefore cannot aptly apply to more recent acts of violence directed at targeted human populations. 42 Their dissatisfaction stems in part, from
the fact that the definition only makes reference to violence perpetrated against
national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups. 43 As a result, they argue, human
groups that are attacked because of political affiliation, socio-economic status, or
sexuality are left with no legal recourse on the international stage. 4 4 Critics likewise find it troubling that the Convention's definition provides no number or
standard by which to determine how many deaths must occur to properly trigger
a genocide finding. 4 5 Other dissenters insist that the definition should embrace
not only the direct physical destruction of members within a targeted group but
also the 6purposeful destruction of that group's cultural and environmental
4
property
By far, the most universal complaint seems to lie with the intent element of the
definition. By requiring proof that an alleged perpetrator specifically intended
his destructive act(s) to further an underlying campaign of group annihilation,
prosecutors are asked to do what is seemingly impossible-determine the mental
state of the accused during the commission of the act.4 7 Not only does such a
40 Id, at Article 2.

41 See Sonali B. Shah, Comments, The Oversight of the Last Great InternationalInstitution of the
Twentieth Century: The International CriminalCourts Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY INT'L. L. REV.
356 (2002).
42 LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 39 (1981) [hereinafter ITS
POLITICAL USE].

43 See Shah, supra note 41, at 381-90.
44 Id.
45 Analysis: Defining Genocide, BBC NEWS, (2001)

at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
1701562.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
46 Id. See also KURT IONASSOHN ET AL., GENOCIDE AND GROSS 1-UMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 25-6 (Transaction Publishers 1998); see also David Marcus, Article, Famine Crimes in InternationalLaw, 97 A.J.I.L. 245, 262-64 (2003) (arguing that international law should extend to man made
famines because "famines are often functionally equivalent to genocide"). Id. at 248.
47 See generally Shah, supra note 41 at 351; See also Greenawalt, supra note 32 at 2281-2282.
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high standard allow for some alleged perpetrators to possibly escape liability by
feigning their acts were motivated by non-genocidal sentiments, but the specific
intent standard also raises questions regarding the scope of liability. 48 Should
liability extend to those persons who, following the directives of another, commit
acts that further the other's genocidal campaign? 49 Or should liability simply rest
with those who instigate a genocidal plot even when he or she has not personally
inflicted the fatal blow? 50 The Convention appears to answer these questions
when it list as punishable the following five acts: (1) genocide; (2) conspiracy to
commit genocide; (3) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (4) attempt to commit genocide; and (5) complicity in genocide. 5' Article 4 of the
Convention further establishes that persons are punishable for genocidal acts
"whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private
individuals. ' 52 However the specific genocidal intent is still a threshold prosecutors must meet when bringing such persons to trial. it is in fact the element of
specific intent within the genocide definition that has resulted in a haphazard
application of the Convention on post-World War II anti-group atrocities.
20th Century Genocides
There is continual debate amongst critics as to how much genocide has occurred during the 20th century. Some commentators limit the number to three:
the mass killings of Armenians by the Turks in the early 1900's, the German
massacre of six millions Jews during the Holocaust, and the slaughter of 800,000
Rwandan Tutsis by their Hutu countrymen in 1994. 53 Other commentators have
been more "generous" in their application of genocide, adding to the anti-group
atrocities enumerated above the near annihilation of the Hereros tribe in Southwest Africa by the Germans5 4 ; the starvation of three million Ukrainians from the
Kulaks class by Stalin's man-made famine55 ; the 1970's slaughter of 1.7 million
Cambodians by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge 56 ; the mass killings of the Ache Indian
48 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 32.
49 Id. at

2265-2289.

50 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 32 (arguing that intent should be knowledge based. Thus
liability would flow to persons who not only specifically intend to commit genocide, but also to persons
who were aware of the consequences of their actions).
51 Genocide Convention, supra 25, art. 3
52 Genocide Convention, supra 25, art. 4
53 See Karyn Becker, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing, availableat http://www.munfw.org - /archive/
50th/4th lhtm (last visited August 12, 2004); See also Genocide Watch End Genocide at http://
www.genocidewatch.org/intemationalcampaign.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Genocide
Watch].
54 See Germany Regrets Namibia 'genocide,' BBC NEWS World Edition (2004) at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afrihttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3388901 .stm
55 See Genocide Watch, supra note 53. (There is a variation in the number of Ukrainans who died in
1932 during Stalin's rule. Some commentors list the figure at three million while others list it as "at least
five million." ) See David Marcus, Article, Familne Crimes in InternationalLaw, 97 A.J.I.L. 245, 245
(2003).
56 See Genocide Watch, supra note 53.
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population by the Paraguarian government from 1962-1972; 57 the mass killings
sysof Timorese during the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor5 8; and the 59
tematic killings of ethnic Kurds by Iraq's former dictator Saddam Hussein.
And yet despite this expansive list of anti-group atrocities, it was not until the
slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda that an international tribunal tried and convicted a
defendant for genocide. 60 At The Hague, former Yugoslavian leader Slobodan
Milosevic is currently charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide for the slaughter of Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnian-Serbian war
of 1992-1995.6 1 Though many commentators argue that "genocidal patterns" are
evident in the mass killings of which Milosevic is charged, they doubt the trial
court will hand down a genocide conviction. 6 2 They concede that in light of the
Convention's specific intent element, there exists insufficient evidence to prove
63
genocidal intent.
This has been a common pattern throughout the history of the Genocide Convention-perpetrators of anti-group atrocities evading liability thanks to the legal
loopholes punctuating the Convention's genocide definition. Participants in antigroup atrocities are aware of such loopholes and unabashedly use them not only
64
to escape punishment but seemingly to minimize the horror of their actions.
Alexander Greenawalt noted such brashness in the response of Paraguay's Defense Minister when questioned about his government's military campaign
against the country's Ache Indian population. 6 5 Though half of the Ache population was slaughtered during the ten-year campaign, the Defense Minister dismissed the idea that his government had committed genocide, pointing out that
the campaign's purpose was purely economical, as it sought to clear for economic development, the area inhabited by the Aches. 66 Thus, because Paraguay's military campaign was motivated by economics and not by the desire to
annihilate the Aches as a group, Paraguay's actions were permissible- in the
eyes of the defense minister. They were also apparently permissible in the eyes
57 Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 2285. See also ITS POLITICAL USE, supra note 42 at 34.
58 See Genocide Watch, supra note 54.
59 See Greenawalt, supra note 33, at 2291.
60 Shah, supra note 41, at 370-71.
61 ERIC. D. WErrz, A CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: UTOPIAS OF RACE AND NATION 191 (Princeton University Press 2003).
62 Analysis: Defining Genocide, supra note 45.
63 Id.

64 See ITS POLITICAL USE, supra note 42, at 34. (Discusses Brazil's and Paraguay's manipulation of
the Convention's intent element when addressing allegations of genocide against the countries' indigenous populations.) See generally Richard Arens, The Ache of Paraguay, in GENOCIDE AND HUMAN
RiGHTS 218 (Jack Nusan Porter ed., University Press of America, 1982) (providing detailed account of
the plight of Paraguay's Ache population during and after Paraguay's military campaign).
65 Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 2285 (The campaign started in 1962 and ended ten years later); see
also ITS POLITICAL USE, supra note 42, at 34.
66

160

Id.

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 2, Issue 1

Heartbreak in Darfur
as no legal sanctions have been levied against the
of the international community,
67
South American country.
The mass killings of a human group due to their political affiliation is also
apparently permissible as evident by the massacre of 1.7 million Cambodians
during a three year period starting in 1975.68 Desiring to create a homogenous
society replete with communist ideology, Pol Pot waged a murderous campaign
69
against those persons and elements that did not fit neatly into his social plan.
He therefore attacked members belonging to the elite and middle classes, intelKhmers, as well as those who
lectuals, ethnic and national minorities, Muslim
70
remained affiliated with past political regimes.
Witnesses to the atrocities reported the mass deportations of urban citizens
into the countryside, 7 1 the kidnappings of young children who were subsequently
placed in labor camps, 72 the closing of monasteries and schools, 73 as well as the
torture and disembowelment of unarmed civilians. 74 The slaughter did not end
until 1979 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and deposed Pol Pot's Khmer
Khmer Rouge had killed off an estimated 20
Rouge. 75 By then Pol Pot and the 76
population.
Cambodia's
of
percent
Though the U.N. has labeled the atrocities "the worst crimes against humanity
since Nazism," Pol Pot was never brought before an international tribunal and
tried for his crimes. 77 Nor have any surviving members of the Khmer Rouge
faced legal actions for their participation in the carnage.78 As Sonali Shah noted,
even if an international tribunal was set up to try and convict members of the
Khmer Rouge, under the Convention only the killings of ethnic and Muslim
Khmers would be actionable. 79 The political killings and murders of persons
67 LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 162 (Yale University Press 1985) [hereinafter LEO
KUPER].

68 WErrIz, supra note 61, at 186.
69 Id. at 145.

70 See generally WErrz, supra note 61 (providing detailed history of the Cambodian conflict).
71 Id. at 166-67
72 Id. at 151.
73 Id.

74 Id. at 178. Much of Cambodia's cultural history was lost during Pol Pot's reign. The Khmer Rouge
destroyed Buddhist Temples and Catholic churches all over the country. "[Klnowledge of longstanding
agricultural practices, and also of Cambodia's traditional art forms, especially in dance and music" were
forgotten by the people. Id. at 186.
75 Id. at 187.

76 Id. at 186. Experts differ on the number of lives lost during the Cambodian crisis. Id.Some
experts list the number as "low" as 800,000 and as high as 1.7 million. Id. One expert insists that
anywhere between 1.17 to 3.42 million people dies under Pol Pot's regime. Id. However, most experts
believe the figure was between 1.5 and 1.7 million. Id.
77 Shah, supra note 41, at 361-65. In fairness to the UN, there have been continual discussions with
the current Cambodian government for the establishment of a tribunal to try those responsible for the
carnage. However there is disagreement between the UN and Cambodia's government on how much
control the later will have over the proceedings. Id. at 363-65.
78 Pol Pot died in April 1998 without ever facing legal actions for his crimes.
79 Shah, supra note 41, at 361-65.
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and disfavored economic classes would therewho belonged to the intellectual
80
fore go without legal redress.
The Politicization of Genocide
The error in not including political and economic groups as one of the protected parties under the Convention has rendered it impotent in a world in which
domestic conflicts are often ignited because of the real or imagined political and/
or economic "contradictions" emanating from a disfavored group or class. In
Leo Kuper's book, The Prevention of Genocide, he notes that genocidal campaigns, past and present, often times consist of a combination of political, ethnic,
and religious mass killings. 8 1 Such "interweaving," as he terms it, is most apparent in pluralistic societies where there exists an array of racial, ethnic, and religious populations with a history of inter-group conflict. 82 According to Kuper, in
these polarized societies, "internal divisions become politicized, and political division tends more and more to coincide with ethnic (or racial or religious) origin.
ethnic factor become interwoven, raising
Thus political mass murders and the
83
difficult problems of classification.
Such interweaving was evident in Cambodia during Pol Pot's reign of terror,
which resulted in the mass killings of persons who were disfavored either because of their ethnic or racial make-up, class status, or political affiliation. The
crisis in the Sudan also appears to represent a melding of political and racial
issues, all of which retain characteristics of interweaving. A vast region comprised of Muslims, Animists (persons who adhere to indigenous African religious
beliefs), and Christians who are further divided into a veritable smorgasbord of
racial and ethnic groups, the Sudanese government has found it difficult to impose its Islamic Fundamentalism on the Sudanese populace. 84 In its effort to gain
control of a people overwhelmingly African in sentiment and culture who have
grown weary of the government's unwillingness to address the needs of all Sudanese, the government has fanned the fires of decades long86hostilities.8 5 The current conflict is at once about race, religion, and politics.
However, the failure of the Convention to serve as a formidable deterrent to
anti-group atrocities has to do not only with the flawed definition of genocide but
also with the political and economic self-interests of nation-states within the international community. At the time of the Convention's drafting there was initial
agreement amongst participating countries that the Convention would include po80

Id.

81 LEO KUPER,
82

Id. at 126-7.

83

Id.

supra note 67, at126.

See The Black Book History of Darfur'sDarkest Chapter, Sudan Tribune (Aug. 21, 2004) at http://
www.sudantribune.com/article-impr.php3?id-article=4868; see also Darfur In Flames, supra note 3.
85 See Darfur In Flames, supra note 3.
84
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litical groups as one of the protected parties. 87 However delegates from Russia,
in an obvious reference to Lemkin and the Jewish Holocaust, soon expressed
concern that such an inclusion would compromise the "'scientific definition of
genocide and would, in practice, distort the perspective in which the crime should
be viewed."' 88 Iranian delegates supported Russia's argument by noting the involuntary membership of persons belonging to a specific racial, ethnic, national,
or religious group as opposed to the voluntary membership of persons belonging
to political parties. 89 Such a distinction, the delegates remarked, rendered "the
destruction of the first type (involuntary members in a group).. .most heinous in
the light of the conscience of humanity, since it was directed against human beings whom chance alone had grouped together." 90
As Leo Kuper notes, it was not that nations believed political groups should
have no protection whatsoever, but rather that such protection should come more
appropriately from governments and national assemblies. 91 Nations have historically demanded the right to suppress rebellious political groups on their own
terms. 92 Many drafters therefore perceived a Convention affording protection to
93
political organizations as inimical to the principle of territorial sovereignty.
They feared such a Convention might be used as a tool to spurn government
resistance during times of domestic discord. 94 It might also invite interference
from "outsiders" seeking to establish their own influence or hegemony. 95 Thus
in spite of counter-arguments and predictions that future genocides would more
than likely be waged primarily on political grounds, the fear that the Convention
would not receive the requisite number of votes for ratification prompted an
agreement 96among the drafters to exclude political groups from the genocide
definition.
87 ITS POLITICAL USE, supra note 42, at 24. Before the actual Genocide Convention was drafted, in
December 1946, the United Nations passed a resolution in which instances of genocide included those
anti-group atrocities directed at "racial, religious, [and] political" groups. Therefore under the 1946
resolution genocide was declared a crime under international law "whether committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds." Id.
88 Id. at 25. Following the 1946 resolution, Ad Hoc Committees were set up for deliberations on the
exact wording of the Genocide Convention. Russian first raised its argument against the inclusion of
political groups under the Convention during the Ad Hoc Committee of 1948.
89 Id. at 26
90 Id.

91 Id. Kuper also notes that the representatives believed the then incomplete Human Rights Commission would provide political groups sufficient protection from governmental abuses.
92 Id at 26-30.
93 Id.
94

Id.

95 Id.

96 Id. at 27-9. During the Ad Hoc Committee meeting on October 14, 1948 delegates from Haiti
argued against the exclusion of political groups from the Convention, on the grounds that "those who
committed the crime of genocide might use the pretext of the political opinions of a racial or religious
group to persecute and destroy it, without becoming liable to international sanctions." Id. at 28. As
Kuper notes, the Haitian delegates "developed the argument further: 'since it was established that genocide always implied the participation or complicity of Governments, that crime would never be suppressed: the Government which was responsible would always be able to allege that the extermination of
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The horrible error in not affording protection to political groups is most evident in the 1972 Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Burundi. Situated in the Great Lakes
region, this small Central African country, which is similar in size to Maryland,
is one of the most densely populated areas on the African continent. 97 Its people
consists of ethnic Hutus, Tutsi, and the Twa "pygmies" of the forest. 98 Though
the Hutus dominate in population figures, historically the minority Tutsi class has
always ruled the country. 99 Prior to Germany's colonization of Burundi in 1899,

a fierce power struggle existed between two rival Tutsi clans-the Bezi and the
Batare-both of whom were members of the country's royal family.?0 Their
support bases consisted of both Hutus and Tutsi resulting in clan loyalties. 10 '
However once Burundi obtained independence ' 0in2 1962 such loyalties gave way
to "a rapid ethnicing of political competition."'
Under Tutsi rule the Hutus-even the elite-had always felt economically and
politically marginalized.10 3 Such sentiments and the political achievements of
Hutus in neighboring Rwanda planted seeds of self-determination in the minds of
the politically frustrated Burundi Hutus. 10 4 In response, the ruling Tutsis took
measures to strengthen their power in order to ensure that the political shifts
occurring in Rwanda did not appear in Burundi as well. 10 5 In April of 1972,
following a brief insurgence by Hutu elites, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 2,000 Tutsis, the Tutsi ruled government responded with a fierce and
systematic counter-attack.' 0 6 Military forces summarily and indiscriminately executed Hutu civilians along with those implicated in the insurgence. 0 7 Educated
Hutus were specifically targeted, as military personnel yanked university students
from class, priests from churches, and medical personnel from local hospitals,
killing anyone who had the misfortune to be Hutu.10 8 Many Hutus simply "disappeared," their bodies never recovered. 0 9 There was talk of mass graves and
the killings of moderate Tutsis.11 0 When the violence ended the Tutsi ruled govany group has been dictated by political considerations, such as the necessity for quelling an insurrection
or maintaining public order.'" Id. at 28-9.
97 Burundi, CIA World Fact Book, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/by.html
(last updated May 11, 2004).
98 Rene Lemarchand, The Hutu-Tutsi Conflict in Burundi, in GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195,
196 (Jack Nusan Porter ed., University Press of America, 1982).
99 Id.
1oo Id. See also Gregory Mthembu-Salter, Burundi, Self-Determination in Focus at http://
wwww.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/brundi-bodt.html (last modified June 17, 2002).
101 Id.
102 Id.

106

Lemarchand, supra note 98, at 199-200.
Mthembu-Salter, supra note 100.
Id.
Lemarchand, supra note 98, at 203-04.

107

Id. at 204.

103
104
105

Id. at 204-05. "The repression took on the qualities of a selective genocide directed at all the
educated or semi educated strata of Hutu society." Id.
109 Id.
110Id.
108
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ernment had slaughtered an estimated 100,000 persons out of 3.5 million, nearly
3.5 percent of Burundi's total population."'
Nontheless, the U.N. has done very little to stop the violence. In Rene Lemarchand's article, "The Hutu-Tutsi Conflict in Burundi", he remarks upon the ti12
midity of the U.N. and the failure of the world's nations to get involved."
Though there had been talk of establishing "aforeign presence" in the region to
try and quell the violence, the U.N. only sent in two-five person missions, seemingly indicating its level of commitment to the conflict. 1 13 Lemarchand attributes
such inaction to the fact that the crisis only involved the killings of Hutu and
Tutsi, thus making it, in the eyes of the U.N., a domestic matter with no real
threat to international security.1 14 The conflict in Burundi therefore "ranked too
far low in the scale of international priorities to justify anything more than a pro
forma intervention."' "15 Lemarchand notes that even the theft of UNICEF Land
purpose of transporting Hutus to their deaths, did not raise the ire
Rovers for the
16
of the U.N.'

African nations were no more helpful in trying to stem the violence. Despite
the presence of Hutu and Tutsi exiles and sympathizers in neighboring Rwanda,
Tanzania, and Zaire, member states belonging to the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) argued that the Burundi conflict was essentially a domestic one and
therefore any outside involvement would be improper.11 7 Yet Lemarchand hypothesizes an alternative motive for the OAU's inaction. Believing that many
African nations saw parallels between their own internal socio-political problems
and those plaguing Burundi, Lemarchand asserts that the African nations did not
want to do anything that would "establish a precedent that might prevent... [them] ... from dealing with such crises by means of... [their] ...

own

choosing." 1 18 Therefore the OAU adopted a resolution which more or less left
peace efforts in the hands of the Tutsi government. 1 9
As for the West, according to Lemarchand, "key figures in the Western diplomatic corps were not even on speaking terms with each other[,]" therefore making it difficult for Western nations to reach any real agreement on how to handle
the crisis. 120 The absence of a political or economic interest in Burundi also
apparently influenced their decision to not get involved in the crisis:
M11
Id.at 195.
112 Id.at 215.
113 Id. at 216.
114 Id.
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id.

Id. at 215.
Id. at 217.

119 Id. at 216. ("[Tlhe wording of the resolution adopted at the OAU Summit in Rabat in late June
1972 strikes one as little short of astounding, amounting in effect to a message of support for Micombere:
'The Council of Ministries is convinced that, thanks to your saving action, peace will be rapidly reestablished, national unity consolidated and territorial integrity preserved.' ") Id.
120 Id. at 215. ("Whereas North Korea and China were the only powers outside Africa to officially
support the [government] regime, the Soviets showed no compunctions about signing the Western note of
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Reflecting on the appalling events of 1972 one journalist was prompted to
ask: "does an international conscience exist?" The answer given by a
Western diplomat sums up the dilemma: 'Nobody wants to start up another fuss in a faraway country if personal interests are not involved.'. . .The sad truth is that Burundi is too far away, too exotic, too
small, in short too marginal in terms of the priorities set by international
21
diplomacy to elicit concern or compassion among Westerns.1
When confronted with accusations that its counter-attack during the political
uprising constituted genocide, the Burundi government justified its actions on
political grounds. 122 The government argued that such a counter-attack was necessary to quell the insurrection and suppress political opposition.123 Again the
Genocide Convention was used not to protect targeted human populations unjustly slaughtered but instead to insure that their murderers would not face
liability. 124
This is not to suggest that sovereign nations should be denied the right to
determine how best to handle their own domestic affairs. It is a commonly accepted principle, that sovereign territories have the "duty to maintain law and
order." 125 However when governments, in their quest to maintain law and order,
employ methods that create more turmoil than not; when governments aim to
achieve peace through violence, death and intimidation; when governments expect unarmed civilians to bear the brunt of political uprisings for no other reason
than their political, familial, ethnical, and/or economic affiliation with; when
governments move beyond the realm of governance and into the realm of mass
slaughter; it raises the question of whether such governments should be left to
their own devices.
Yet, as Kuper asserts, the exclusion of political groups under the Convention,
has done exactly that. By honoring the principle of territorial sovereignty, Kuper
argues that the Convention has inadvertently upheld a sovereign state's perceived
right to commit genocide on its own people, albeit on political grounds-"to
126
maintain law and order. . . to preserve the territorial integrity of the state."'
Such a-hopefully-unintended endorsement has colored the reaction and commitment of the U.N. to domestic conflicts gone amok:
protest, in part because differences of opinion among Western diplomats made the note sound platitudinous, if not downright hypocritical. With the exception of Belgium, the dominant impression one gains
of Western diplomacy during the crisis is one of almost total indifference in the face of an unrelieved
tragedy.") Id.
121
122

Id. at 217.
ITS POLITICAL USE, supra

note 42, at 29.

123 Id.
124 Id. ("At meetings in 1973, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protections
of Minorities forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights a complaint against Burundi of consistent
patterns of gross violations of human rights. But when the Commission met in 1974, it effectively
shelved the matter by appointing a new working party to communicate with the government by Burundi,
and to report back to the next annual meeting of the Commission.") Id. at 164.
125 Id. at 161.
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And though the norm for the United Nations is to sit by, and watch, like a
grandstand spectator, the unfolding of the genocidal conflict in the domestic arena right through to the final massacres, there would generally
be concern, and action to provide humanitarian2 7relief for the refugees, and
direct intercession by the Secretary-General.'
Such action is inadequate in dealing with today's domestic conflicts, especially when governments seem to resort more and more to mass carnage in their
quest to retain power. Yet, as Kuper so eloquently put it, humanity is too often
sacrificed for the benefit of the Territorial State.' 2 8 Given the diverse realities of
human life where ethnic issues can quickly become political and political ones
can just as easily take on an ethnic, racial, or religious slant, such a sacrifice is all
too pervasive and too great.
Conclusion
The failure of the Convention to afford protection to political and economic
groups renders it an empty gesture providing false hope for today's victims of
anti-group atrocities. By leaning too heavily on the particulars of the Jewish
Holocaust and Ralph Lemkin's definition of genocide, the Convention has left
millions of people vulnerable to governmental abuses. Conversely, by neglecting
to apply the Convention even in those circumstances where application is by law
proper, many are left wondering if the commitment "to prevent and punish genocide" is fact or pure fiction.
Therefore, if the Convention is to have any force it must apply to the realities
and character of anti-group atrocities as they exist today. The "rules" of genocide have changed. No longer will perpetrators of genocidal crimes be as ostentatious and industrial in their genocidal designs as in the case of Hitler, and the
Hutus of Rwanda. No longer will they publicly admit to harboring ethnic, racial,
or religious resentments to the point of murderous insanity. And no longer will
they kill on ethnic, racial, or religious grounds alone. Perpetrators of genocidal
acts have become more sophisticated, more cognizant of how far they can go in
their domestic affairs before raising the suspicions and outrage of the international community. Therefore if the Convention is to have any real force and act
as an effective deterrent for anti-group atrocities, four principles must be applied:
(1) members of the U.N. General Assembly must realistically evaluate their own
goals, whether they be political or economic, domestic or international, and determine if they mesh well with basic human decency and the humanitarian principles they themselves extol; (2) the definition of genocide must be expanded to
include political groups as one of the protected parties under the Convention; (3)
as Alexander Greenawalt argues, the intent element must also undergo a revision,
extending liability to "those who may personally lack a specific genocidal purpose but who commit genocidal acts while understanding the destructive conse127

Id.
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Id.at 183.
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quences of their actions;"' 29 and (4) the international community must affirm and
not fear the famous question, "Am I my brother's keeper?" 1 3
This final admonishment is perhaps the most important in light of the rise in
incidents of domestic and international terrorism. Long dead are the days of
sapping the strength of others for self-interested purposes. The fear and threat of
reprisal is real and devastating. If the international community truly desires to
maintain international security and domestic peace, each nation and government
must ensure that it is not itself committing acts which compromise such security
and peace. It is very noble to enact laws aimed at holding communities to a
higher standard, however if such laws fail to register in the reality, they become
little more than empty promises.
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Greenawalt, supra note 32, at 2259.
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